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Abstract
In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional in-
terval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the
lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We ax-
iomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we
provide some axiomatic characterizations of the upper value of finite
two-person zero-sum games.
1 Introduction
The problem of associating a coalitional game with every strategic game
was already addressed by von Neumann and Morgenstern in their pioneer
1944 book. As they write in section 25.2.1, their purpose is “to determine
everything that can be said about coalitions between players, compensations
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between partners in every coalition, mergers or fights between coalitions,
etc., in terms of the characteristic function v(S) alone”. They define v(S)
using a zero-sum game between coalition S on one hand, and coalition N \S
consisting of the other players on the other hand, and taking into account
that the mixed extension of this game “has a well defined value” (see section
25.1.2).
The literature drifted away from the zero-sum game approach to this
problem and toward a Nash-equilibrium approach. See, for example, Har-
sanyi (1963), Myerson (1991), and Bergantin˜os and Garc´ıa-Jurado (1995).
Recently, the zero-sum game approach was revived in Carpente et al. (2005).
In that paper, the same zero-sum games as in von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944) are used, but attention is limited to coordinated actions by
coalitions of players rather than mixed strategies. They take a conservative
or pessimistic point of view and define v(S) to be the worth that the players
in S can guarantee for themselves no matter what actions the players in the
complementary coalition play. Hence, they use the lower value of the zero-
sum game between coalition S and coalition N \S. A more optimistic point
of view would be to consider the worth of a coalition to be the amount that
it can obtain for its members by correctly anticipating the actions of the
complementary coalition and to use the upper value of the zero-sum game
between coalition S and coalition N \ S.
In general, the pessimistic and optimistic methods lead to different pre-
dictions. Rather than choosing between them, in the current paper we sim-
ply acknowledge the fact that for every coalition S in a strategic game there
is a reasonable range of worths that it can expect to obtain. This range is
bounded from below by the pessimistic prediction obtained using the lower
value of the associated zero-sum game and it is bounded from above by the
optimistic prediction obtained using the upper value of that game. In doing
so, we associate with each strategic game a coalitional interval game. A
coalitional interval game is a pair (N, v), where N is the set of players, and
v is a correspondence that associates with every coalition S ⊂ N an interval
v(S) that indicates that the worth of the coalition will be somewhere in this
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range.
Interval games were introduced and analyzed by Branzei et al. (2002)
in the context of bankruptcy problems. In another paper, Branzei et al.
(2003) propose two possible extensions of the Shapley value to the setting
of interval bankruptcy games. We believe that in our setting of finding
coalitional games to describe coalitions’ expectations in strategic games,
interval games are a very appropriate model because of the uncertainty that
arises from not knowing the actions chosen by the complementary coalitions.
Hence, it is very natural to represent the expectations of a coalition S as the
interval defined by the lower and upper values of the zero-sum game played
by S against N \ S. We formally introduce this method, which we call the
lowper method, and characterize it axiomatically.
In order to understand the method based on the lower and the upper
values of zero-sum games fully, we use results on the lower value as ob-
tained in Carpente et al. (2005) and take some time to study the upper
value of zero-sum games in the current paper. We combine the results for
the lower and upper values to obtain axiomatic characterizations of what we
call the lowper value: the interval defined by the lower and upper values. We
then move on to the coalitional (interval) games associated with strategic
games through zero-sum games between coalitions and their complements
and the lower value, the upper value, and the lowper value. We prove that
all these associated coalitional (interval) games are superadditive and show
that, in fact, every superadditive coalitional game can be obtained as arising
from a strategic game through either method. This extends a result in von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) for coalitional games based on values of
mixed extensions of the zero-sum games between coalitions and their com-
plements. It shows that if we take seriously the idea that coalitional games
describe coalitions’ possibilities in strategic situations, then those coalitional
games are going to be superadditive, and it also shows that every superad-
ditive coalitional game can be interpreted as one that describes coalitions’
possibilities in strategic situations.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we consider
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the lower and upper values of finite zero-sum two-player games. We recall
axiomatizations of the lower value and provide ones of the upper value. In
Section 3 we define the lowper value of finite zero-sum two-player games and
provide two axiomatic characterizations of this evaluation correspondence.
In Section 4 we consider coalitional (interval) games associated with strate-
gic games. We address the superadditivity of the coalitional games based
on the lower value, the upper value, and the lowper value, and show that all
superadditive coalitional games can be obtained as arising from a strategic
game through either method. In Section 5 we provide axiomatic character-
izations of the lowper method, which associates a coalitional interval game
with every strategic game. Finally, in Section 6 we provide some remarks
on a possible extension of the current paper by applying Shapley values to
the coalitional interval game that is obtained using the lowper method.
2 Values of finite two-person zero-sum games
We start by concentrating on finite two-person zero-sum games. We provide
definitions of the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games.
We also develop axiomatic characterizations of the upper value.
A finite two-person zero-sum game is modeled as a finite real matrix A.
In this game, player 1 chooses a row and player 2 chooses a column and the
number in the corresponding cell of the matrix is the amount that player 2
pays player 1 when these actions are chosen. Hence, if A = [aij ]i∈M, j∈N is
an m × n matrix, then the action sets of players 1 and 2, respectively, are
M = {1, . . . ,m} and N = {1, . . . , n}, and if player 1 chooses action i ∈ M
and player 2 chooses action j ∈ N , then player 1’s payoff is aij and player
2’s payoff is −aij . We will refer to the finite two-person zero-sum game
associated with matrix A as the matrix game A or simply the game A.
In the game A, player 1 wants to maximize aij and player 2 wants to
minimize it. This leads to the definitions of the lower and upper values. The
lower and upper values of A, V (A) and V (A) respectively, are defined as:
V (A) := max
i∈M
min
j∈N
aij
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V (A) := min
j∈N
max
i∈M
aij .
Player 1 can make sure his payoff is not lower than the lower value by
choosing an action i ∈ M such that the minimum over all j ∈ N of aij is
V (A). Also, player 2 can make sure that he does not have to pay more than
the upper value by choosing an action j ∈ N such that the maximum over
all i ∈ M of aij is V (A). Of course, if player 1 can make sure he gets at
least V (A) and player 2 can make sure player 1 gets no more than V (A), it
follows immediately that V (A) ≤ V (A).
We denote the set of real matrices by A. The lower value function
V : A → R, associates with every matrix A ∈ A its lower value V (A). The
upper value function V : A → R is defined similarly. The lower and upper
value functions are examples of evaluation functions, which we define as
real-valued functions f : A → R that assign to every matrix A ∈ A a real
number reflecting the evaluation of the finite two-person zero-sum game A
from the point of view of player 1.
The lower value function was axiomatically characterized in Carpente et
al. (2005). We state their characterization of the lower value function and
provide an axiomatic characterization for the upper value function.
The following properties of an evaluation function f : A → R were used
in Carpente et al. (2005).
Objectivity. For all a ∈ R, f([a]) = a 1.
Monotonicity. For all A,B ∈ A, if A ≥ B, then f(A) ≥ f(B).
Weak row dominance. The ith row of the matrix A, denoted ri, is
strongly dominated if there exists another row rk (k 6= i) in the matrix
that is weakly larger than row ri, i.e., akj ≥ aij for all j ∈ N . For all
A ∈ A, if row r is strongly dominated, then f(A) = f(A \ r).2
Strong column dominance. The jth column of the matrix A, de-
noted cj , is weakly dominated if for all i ∈ M there exists another
1Here, [a] denotes the 1× 1 matrix A with a11 = a.
2A \ r denotes the matrix obtained from A by deleting row r. Similarly, we use the
notation A \ c when deleting a column c.
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column ck (k 6= j) such that aik ≤ aij . For all A ∈ A, if column c is
weakly dominated, then f(A) = f(A \ c).
Objectivity states that in a trivial situation where both players have
exactly one action available, player 1’s evaluation is the payoff that player
1 receives when both players play their unique actions. Monotonicity states
that a weak increase in player 1’s payoff for every possible choice of actions
by both players should not result in a decrease in player 1’s evaluation. Weak
row dominance expresses that player 1’s evaluation should not change if he
can no longer choose an action that is never better for him than some other
action that is available to him. Strong column dominance states that player
1’s evaluation does not change when player 2 can no longer use an action
that is weakly dominated. An action for player 2 is weakly dominated when
for every action by player 1, there is another action for player 2 that results
in a weakly lower payoff for player 1 and therefore a weakly higher payoff
for player 2. Note that this can be a different action of player 2 for every
action by player 1.
Theorem 1 (Carpente et al. (2005)) The lower value function V is the
unique evaluation function that satisfies objectivity, monotonicity, weak row
dominance, and strong column dominance.
Analogous to Theorem 1, we can provide an axiomatic characterization
of the upper value function. In addition to objectivity and monotonicity, this
characterization uses the following two properties of an evaluation function
f : A → R.
Strong row dominance. The ith row of the matrix A, denoted ri, is
weakly dominated if for every j ∈ N there exists another row rk (k 6= i)
such that akj ≥ aij . For all A ∈ A, if row r is weakly dominated, then
f(A) = f(A \ r).
Weak column dominance. The jth column of the matrix A, denoted
cj , is strongly dominated if there exists another column ck (k 6= j) in
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the matrix that is weakly smaller than column cj , i.e., aik ≤ aij for
all i ∈ M . For all A ∈ A, if column c is strongly dominated, then
f(A) = f(A \ c).
Note that strong row dominance implies weak row dominance. This holds
because every row that is strongly dominated is also weakly dominated. So,
if f satisfies strong row dominance and r is a strongly dominated row, then r
is weakly dominated and can be eliminated without changing the evaluation.
Analogously, strong column dominance implies weak column dominance.
Theorem 2 The upper value function V is the unique evaluation function
that satisfies objectivity, monotonicity, strong row dominance, and weak col-
umn dominance.
Proof. Existence. It is easily seen that V satisfies objectivity andmonotonic-
ity. To see that V satisfies weak column dominance, note that maxi∈M aik ≤
maxi∈M aij if column cj is strongly dominated by column ck in matrix A.
This means that player 2 does not need column cj to reach the minimum
of these expressions, which equals V (A). To see that V satisfies strong
row dominance, note that if row ri is weakly dominated in matrix A, then
maxk∈M akj = maxk∈M\i akj for every j ∈ N . Hence, deleting row ri does
not change the upper value.
Uniqueness. To prove that there is no other evaluation function that
satisfies objectivity, monotonicity, strong row dominance, and weak column
dominance, let f : A → R be an evaluation function satisfying these prop-
erties and take a matrix A = [aij ]i∈M,j∈N ∈ A. Suppose, without loss of
generality, that V (A) is the element in the ith row and the jth column. We
then have
f(A) ≤ f(
 max{a11, a1j} · · · max{a1n, a1j}... . . . ...
max{am1, amj} · · · max{amn, amj}
) =
f(
 a1j...
amj
) = f([aij ]) = aij = V (A).
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Here, we have used monotonicity to create a matrix in which the jth column
strongly dominates all other columns so that we can then apply weak column
dominance (repeatedly) to delete all the other columns. The m× 1 matrix
that is left consists of the jth column of A and for this column we know that
aij ≥ akj for all k ∈M because V (A) = aij . So, in the remaining matrix all
rows other than the ith one are weakly dominated and can be eliminated by
strong row dominance. Objectivity provides the last step.
To show that f(A) ≥ V (A), we first add a row to the matrix A in which
all elements are equal to V (A). Note that such a row is weakly dominated
and its addition will not alter the valuation by strong row dominance. Using
monotonicity, we make all rows weakly dominated by the newly added one,
so that we can apply strong row dominance (repeatedly) to eliminate all but
the newly added row. In the resulting 1 × n matrix all elements are equal
to V (A), so that all columns but one can be eliminated by weak column
dominance. Application of objectivity finishes the following sequence.
f(A) = f(

a11 · · · a1n
...
. . .
...
am1 · · · amn
V (A) · · · V (A)
) ≥
f(

min{a11, V (A)} · · · min{a1n, V (A)}
...
. . .
...
min{am1, V (A)} · · · min{amn, V (A)}
V (A) · · · V (A)
) =
f([V (A) . . . V (A)]) = f([V (A)]) = V (A).
We have shown that f(A) = V (A), which proves that the upper value V is
the unique evaluation function that satisfies objectivity, monotonicity, strong
row dominance, and weak column dominance. 2
Carpente et al. (2005) show that in the axiomatization of the lower value
provided in Theorem 1, monotonicity can be replaced by row elimination and
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column elimination. Row elimination states that if player 1 looses the ability
to use one of his strategies, then his evaluation should not increase. Column
elimination states that player 1’s evaluation does not decrease and therefore
player 2’s evaluation does not increase when player 2 looses the ability to
use one of his strategies.
Row elimination. For all A ∈ A and all rows r of A, f(A) ≥ f(A\r).
Column elimination. For all A ∈ A and all columns c of A, f(A) ≤
f(A \ c).
Theorem 3 (Carpente et al. (2005)) The lower value function V is the
unique evaluation function that satisfies objectivity, row elimination, column
elimination, weak row dominance, and strong column dominance.
In the axiomatization of the upper value we can also replace monotonicity
by row elimination and column elimination. This gives us the following
axiomatization of the upper value.
Theorem 4 The upper value function V is the unique evaluation function
that satisfies objectivity, row elimination, column elimination, strong row
dominance, and weak column dominance.
Proof. Existence. We already established that V satisfies objectivity, strong
row dominance, and weak column dominance. To see that it also satisfies
row elimination and column elimination, it suffices to note that taking the
maximum over a smaller set leads to a weakly smaller value and that taking
the minimum over a smaller set leads to a weakly larger value.
Uniqueness. The proof of uniqueness is analogous to that in Theorem 2.
Let f : A → R be an evaluation function that satisfies the five axioms listed
in the theorem and let A = [aij ]i∈M,j∈N ∈ A. Suppose, without loss of
generality, that V (A) is the element in the ith row and the jth column.
Then, applying column elimination, strong row dominance, and objectivity,
successively, we obtain
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f(A) ≤ f(
 a1j...
amj
) = f([aij ]) = aij = V (A).
Using strong row dominance, row elimination, weak column dominance, and
objectivity, we obtain
f(A) = f(

a11 · · · a1n
...
. . .
...
am1 · · · amn
V (A) · · · V (A)
) ≥
f([V (A) . . . V (A)]) = f([V (A)]) = V (A).
This proves that f(A) = V (A). 2
3 The lowper interval value
Our interest in values of two-person zero-sum games stems from our quest for
methods to find coalitional games that appropriately describe coalitions’ ex-
pectations in strategic games. We will discuss these methods extensively in
the next section, but remark here that the lower value provides a pessimistic
expectation, whereas the upper value provides an optimistic expectation. In
the current section, rather than taking either an optimistic or a pessimistic
point of view, we simply recognize that the expectations are bound by these
two values and consider the correspondence that associates with each matrix
game A the interval [V (A), V (A)], with the lower value as its lower bound
and the upper value as its upper bound. We call this correspondence the
lowper value and denote it by V .
In the current section, we provide two axiomatizations of the lowper
value. Both are inspired by the axiomatic characterizations of the lower and
upper values discussed in the previous section.
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The lowper value is an evaluation correspondence, which we define as an
interval-valued correspondence f that assigns to every matrix A ∈ A a real
interval [f(A), f(A)], where f(A) ∈ R, f(A) ∈ R, and f(A) ≤ f(A). This
interval reflects player 1’s evaluation of the finite two-person zero-sum game
A.
We define some properties of an evaluation correspondence f on A.3 To
simplify our notations, we introduce the inequality between intervals defined
by [a, b] ≥ [c, d] if and only if a ≥ c and b ≥ d. Also, we define an addition
of intervals by [a, b] + [c, d] = [e, f ] where e = a+ c and f = b+ d.
Objectivity. For all a ∈ R, f([a]) = [a, a].
Monotonicity. For all A,B ∈ A, if A ≥ B, then f(A) ≥ f(B).
Weak row dominance. For all A ∈ A, if row r is strongly dominated,
then f(A) = f(A \ r).
Weak column dominance. For all A ∈ A, if column c is strongly
dominated, then f(A) = f(A \ c).
The lowper value satisfies all these four properties. Moreover, it is the
maximal evaluation correspondence that satisfies the properties, in the way
specified in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 The lowper value function V satisfies objectivity, monotonici-
ty, weak row dominance, and weak column dominance. Moreover, if f is an
evaluation correspondence that satisfies these four properties, then f(A) ⊂
V (A) for each A ∈ A.
Proof. Existence. We already know that the lower value and the upper
value both satisfy objectivity, monotonicity, weak row dominance, and weak
column dominance.4 The interval that the lowper value associates with each
3Note that we give these properties the same names as the corresponding properties
for evaluation functions. This shouldn’t be a source of confusion as it will always be clear
from the context what version of the properties is intended.
4We remind the reader that strong row dominance implies weak row dominance and
strong column dominance implies weak column dominance.
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matrix game A ∈ A has as its lower bound the lower value and as its upper
bound the upper value. From this it readily follows that the lowper value
satisfies objectivity, monotonicity, weak row dominance, and weak column
dominance.
Maximality. Let f be an evaluation correspondence that satisfies the
four axioms listed in the theorem and let A = [aij ]i∈M,j∈N ∈ A.
First we consider the lower bound of the interval [f(A), f(A)]. Suppose,
without loss of generality, that V (A) is the element in the ith row and the jth
column. First, we use monotonicity to make all the rows strongly dominated
by the ith row. Then, we apply weak row dominance (repeatedly) to delete
all the other rows. We are then left with a 1 × n matrix consisting of the
ith row of A. Because V (A) = aij , we know that aik ≥ aij for all k ∈ N .
Hence, in the 1 × n matrix, all columns different from the jth are strongly
dominated and can be eliminated by weak column dominance. Then, we can
apply objectivity, and obtain
f(A) ≥ f(
 min{a11, ai1} · · · min{a1n, ain}... . . . ...
min{am1, ai1} · · · min{amn, ain}
) =
f([ai1 . . . ain]) = f([aij ]) = aij = V (A).
With respect to the upper bound of the interval [f(A), f(A)], we can
show that f(A) ≤ V (A) in a manner analogous to that followed in the proof
of Theorem 2. We do not repeat this proof here, but refer the reader to the
relevant part of the proof of Theorem 2.
Combining the two inequalities that we have shown, we obtain f(A) ⊂
V (A) for each A ∈ A. 2
The characterization in Theorem 5 is not tight in the sense that it leaves
room for a correspondence to associate with a matrix A ∈ A an interval that
is strictly contained in the interval [V (A), V (A)]. In Theorem 6 we provide
a tight axiomatization of the lowper value. To do this, we need two more
properties of evaluation correspondences.
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Strong row dominance in the upper bound. For all A ∈ A, if
row r is weakly dominated, then f(A) = f(A \ r).
Strong column dominance in the lower bound. For all A ∈ A,
if column c is weakly dominated, then f(A) = f(A \ c).
Theorem 6 The lowper value function V is the unique evaluation corre-
spondence that satisfies objectivity, monotonicity, weak row dominance, weak
column dominance, strong row dominance in the upper bound, and strong
column dominance in the lower bound.
Proof. Existence. We already know that the lowper value satisfies objec-
tivity, monotonicity, weak row dominance, and weak column dominance. It
readily follows from strong row dominance of the upper value and strong
column dominance of the lower value that the lowper value also satisfies
strong row dominance in the upper bound, and strong column dominance in
the lower bound.
Uniqueness. To prove that there is no other evaluation correspondence
that satisfies objectivity, monotonicity, weak row dominance, weak column
dominance, strong row dominance in the upper bound, and strong column
dominance in the lower bound, let f be an evaluation correspondence that
satisfies these six properties and let A = [aij ]i∈M,j∈N ∈ A. It readily follows
from Theorem 5 that f(A) ⊂ V (A), so the proof of uniqueness will be
completed if we prove that f(A) ≤ V (A) and f(A) ≥ V (A).
We start with the lower bound of the interval. To show that f(A) ≤
V (A), we first add a column to the matrix A in which all elements are equal
to V (A). Note that such a column is weakly dominated, so by strong column
dominance in the lower bound, this addition will not alter the lower bound.
Then, we apply monotonicity to make all columns weakly dominated by the
newly added one, after which we use strong column dominance in the lower
bound again (repeatedly) to eliminate all these other columns. We are then
left with a m× 1 matrix in which all elements are equal to V (A), in which
all rows are strongly dominated so that we can eliminate all but one of them
by weak row dominance. Then, we can apply objectivity, and obtain
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f(A) = f(
 a11 · · · a1n V (A)... . . . ... ...
am1 · · · amn V (A)
) ≤
f(
 max{a11, V (A)} · · · max{a1n, V (A)} V (A)... . . . ... ...
max{am1, V (A)} · · · max{amn, V (A)} V (A)
) =
f(
 V (A)...
V (A)
) = f([V (A)]) = V (A).
We now consider the upper bound of the interval. To show that f(A) ≥
V (A), we first add a row to the matrix A in which all elements are equal to
V (A). Note that such a row is weakly dominated and its addition will not
alter the upper bound by strong row dominance in the upper bound. Using
monotonicity, we make all rows weakly dominated by the newly added one,
so that we can apply strong row dominance in the upper bound (repeatedly)
to eliminate all but the newly added row. In the resulting 1× n matrix all
elements are equal to V (A), so that all columns but one can be eliminated
by weak column dominance. Application of objectivity finishes the following
sequence.
f(A) = f(

a11 · · · a1n
...
. . .
...
am1 · · · amn
V (A) · · · V (A)
) ≥
f(

min{a11, V (A)} · · · min{a1n, V (A)}
...
. . .
...
min{am1, V (A)} · · · min{amn, V (A)}
V (A) · · · V (A)
) =
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f([V (A) . . . V (A)]) = f([V (A)]) = V (A).
This completes the proof of the theorem. 2
4 Coalitional interval games associated with strate-
gic games
Methods to associate coalitional games with strategic games appear already
in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), whose method is based on the
value of matrix games, and in Carpente et al. (2005), who study a method
that is based on the lower value function. As discussed in Carpente et al.
(2005), the approach taken by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) re-
quires mixing of coordinated strategies of coalitions. The lower-value based
method requires only coordinated actions, but it takes a very conservative
or pessimistic approach to the problem of finding the worths of coalitions in
strategic games and looks at what the members of a coalition can guarantee
themselves. A method based on the upper value would provide an optimistic
approach and look at what the members of a coalition may obtain if they
can react optimally to their opponents’ actions. Alternatively, a method
based on the upper value looks at what the other players cannot prevent the
members of a coalition from getting.
We believe that this is a very natural situation for interval games to arise.
In the current paper, rather than taking either an optimistic or a pessimistic
point of view, we simply recognize that the expectations of coalitions are
bound by the lower and upper values and associate with each strategic game
an interval game. We start by providing the necessary definitions.
A strategic game g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) consists of a set of players
N = {1, . . . , n}, and for every player i ∈ N a set of actions Xi available
to this player, and a payoff function ui :
∏
j∈N Xj → R. In this paper we
consider only finite strategic games, which are those games in which the
actions sets {Xi}i∈N are all finite. The class of finite strategic games with
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player set N is denoted by ΓN . We denote the class of all finite strategic
games by Γ.
A coalitional game is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of
players and v : 2N → R is the characteristic function of the game, assigning
to each coalition S ⊂ N its worth v(S). The worth v(S) of a coalition
S represents the benefits that this coalition can obtain for its members.
By convention, v(∅) = 0. From now on, we identify a coalitional game
(N, v) with its characteristic function v. We denote the class of coalitional
games with player set N by GN and we use G to denote the class of all
coalitional games. A coalitional game v ∈ GN is said to be superadditive if
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N with S ∩ T = ∅.
A coalitional interval game with player set N is a pair (N, v), where
the correspondence v associates an interval v(S) = [v(S), v(S)] with each
coalition S ⊂ N . The interpretation of this game is that a coalition S
can obtain for its members a worth that is somewhere in the interval v(S).
We define v(∅) = [0, 0]. Note that each coalitional game (N, v) can easily be
modeled as an interval game where the interval associated with a coalition S
consists of one point only, the point v(S). We denote the class of coalitional
interval games with player set N by IGN and we use IG to denote the class
of all coalitional interval games. A coalitional interval game v ∈ IGN is said
to be superadditive if v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T )5 for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N
with S ∩ T = ∅.
Our method to associate coalitional (interval) games with strategic games
is based on the following procedure that was proposed in von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944). Let g ∈ ΓN be a strategic game and take a non-empty
coalition S ⊂ N , S 6= N . The two-person zero-sum game gS is defined by
gS = ({S,N \ S}, {XS , XN\S}, {uS ,−uS}),
where, for all T ⊂ N , XT =
∏
i∈T Xi and uT =
∑
i∈T ui. In this game, there
are two players, coalition S and coalition N \S. The actions available to each
of these two coalitions are all the combinations of the actions available to its
5Addition of and inequality between intervals are as defined on page 11.
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members in the game g. The payoff to coalition S is the sum of the payoffs
of its members for every possible actions tuple, and the payoff to coalition
N \ S is the opposite of this. Note that the game gS is a finite two-person
zero-sum game. We denote by AS the matrix of this game. Now, we can
look at the lower or upper values of the game gS as expectations of coalition
S in the strategic game g. They represent the worth that the members of
coalition S expect to be able to attain for themselves even if the players in
N \ S cooperate to keep the worth of coalition S as low as possible. For
the grand coalition N , there are no players outside the coalition to try and
keep the worth of N as low as possible and therefore the worth of the grand
coalition is simply the maximum that its members can get.
Carpente et al. (2005) consider the lower-value method that associates
with a strategic game g ∈ ΓN the coalitional game vg ∈ GN defined by
vg(S) = V (AS)
for all non-empty S ⊂ N , S 6= N , and vg(N) = maxx∈XN uN (x). This
coalitional game represents a conservative or pessimistic point of view in
that the worth of a coalition is defined as the amount that it can guarantee
for its members by choosing an appropriate coordinated action. There exists
an action xS ∈ XS such that uS(xS , xN\S) ≥ vg(S) for all xN\S ∈ XN\S .
The upper-value method associates with a strategic game g ∈ ΓN the
coalitional game vg ∈ GN defined by
vg(S) = V (AS)
for all non-empty S ⊂ N , S 6= N , and vg(N) = maxx∈XN uN (x). This
coalitional game represents an optimistic point of view in that the worth
of a coalition is defined as the amount that it can obtain for its members
by correctly anticipating the coordinated action of its opponents. For every
xN\S ∈ XN\S , there exists an action xS ∈ XS such that uS(xS , xN\S) ≥
vg(S).
The lowper value method associates with a strategic game g ∈ ΓN the
coalitional interval game vg ∈ IGN defined by
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vg(S) = V (AS) = [V (AS), V (AS)]
for all non-empty S ⊂ N , S 6= N , and
vg(N) = [max
x∈XN
uN (x), max
x∈XN
uN (x)].
This coalitional interval game takes neither a pessimistic nor an optimistic
point of view, but acknowledges that coalition S will obtain a worth some-
where between the pessimistic and the optimistic expectations. Note that for
the grand coalition we obtain an interval that contains exactly one element,
so that we obtain a class of coalitional interval games for which efficiency,
for example, is well-defined.
We illustrate these three games in the following example.
Example 1 Consider the following three-player strategic game g.6
α3 α2 β2
α1 (1, 0, 0) (1, 2, 3)
β1 (0, 1, 2) (1, 2, 0)
β3 α2 β2
α1 (0, 0, 2) (2, 0, 2)
β1 (1, 1, 2) (0, 1, 2)
Consider the 2-player coalition S = {1, 3}. The matrix of the 2-person zero-
sum game associated with this coalition is
AS =

1 4
2 1
2 4
3 2
 ,
where the columns correspond to the strategies α2 and β2 (from left to right)
of player 2 ∈ N \ S and the rows are ordered as follows. The first row
corresponds to the strategies (α1, α3) by the players in S, the second row to
(β1, α3), the third row to (α1, β3), and the fourth row to (β1, β3). The lower
6Following the general standard, player 1 is the row player, player 2 the column player,
and player 3 chooses the matrix to the left or that to the right.
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value of this matrix is V (AS) = 2 and its upper value equals V (AS) = 3.
Hence, we find that vg(1, 3) = 2, vg(1, 3) = 3 and vg(1, 3) = [2, 3].
Following the same procedure, we find the worths of the other coalitions to
be vg(1) = vg(2) = 0, vg(3) = 2, vg(1, 2) = vg(2, 3) = 2, vg(1, 2, 3) = 6, and
vg(1) = 1, vg(2) = 0, vg(3) = 2, vg(1, 2) = 2, vg(2, 3) = 3, vg(1, 2, 3) = 6.
The coalitional interval game vg associates the following intervals with the
various coalitions: vg(1) = [0, 1], vg(2) = [0, 0], vg(3) = vg(1, 2) = [2, 2],
vg(1, 3) = vg(2, 3) = [2, 3], and vg(1, 2, 3) = [6, 6].
This example illustrates that in general the two coalitional games vg and
vg are different, so that vg is a non-degenerate interval game.
The games vg, vg, and vg that we can obtain in the previous example
are all superadditive. This is not a coincidence, but holds for all coalitional
(interval) games derived in the described manner from strategic games using
the lower, upper, or lowper value. For the games vg this was shown in
Carpente et al. (2005) and for the games vg we show this in the following
proposition. Note that superadditivity of the lowper value interval game
vg readily follows from superadditivity of the lower value game vg and the
upper value game vg.
Proposition 1 For every strategic game g ∈ ΓN , the associated coalitional
game vg is superadditive.
Proof. Let g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈ ΓN be a strategic game and take
two non-empty coalitions S, T ⊂ N , such that S ∩ T = ∅. Then
vg(S ∪ T ) = min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
max
xST∈XS∪T
uS∪T (xST , x−ST ) =
min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
max
xS∈XS
max
xT∈XT
uS∪T (xS , xT , x−ST ).
Let yS ∈ XS and yT ∈ XT . For any y−ST ∈ XN\(S∪T ) we have that
uS∪T (yS , yT , y−ST ) ≤ max
xS∈XS
max
xT∈XT
uS∪T (xS , xT , y−ST ).
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Then, it holds that
vg(S ∪ T ) = min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
max
xS∈XS
max
xT∈XT
uS∪T (xS , xT , x−ST ) ≥
min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uS∪T (yS , yT , x−ST ).
Using this, we derive that
vg(S ∪ T ) ≥ min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uS∪T (yS , yT , x−ST ) ≥
min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uS(yS , yT , x−ST ) + min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uT (yS , yT , x−ST ) ≥
min
xT∈XT
min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uS(yS , xT , x−ST )+
min
xS∈XS
min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uT (xS , yT , x−ST ) =
min
x−S∈XN\S
uS(yS , x−S) + min
x−T∈XN\T
uT (yT , x−T ).
Since this holds for all yS ∈ XS and yT ∈ XT , we can use this to derive that
vg(S ∪ T ) ≥ min
x−S∈XN\S
max
xS∈XS
uS(xS , x−S) + min
x−T∈XN\T
max
xT∈XT
uT (xT , x−T ) =
vg(S) + vg(T ).
This proves that vg is superadditive. 2
In fact, every superadditive coalitional game (N, v) can be obtained as
both a game (N, vg) and a game (N, vg). We prove this in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 For every superadditive coalitional game (N,w), there exists
a strategic game g ∈ ΓN such that w = vg and w = vg.
Proof. Let (N,w) ∈ GN be a superadditive coalitional game. Define the
strategic game g(w) = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈ ΓN by Xi = {xi ⊂ N | i ∈
xi} for each i ∈ N and
ui(xN ) =
{ 1
|xi|w(xi) if xj = xi for all j ∈ xi
w(i) otherwise.
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In this game, each player announces which coalition he wants to be a member
of. The multi-player coalitions that are formed are the ones for which all of
its members have indicated that they want to form exactly this coalition.
The players who are not a member of such a multi-player coalition each form
a singleton coalition. In each (one- or multi-player) coalition that is formed,
the members of the coalition share the worth of the coalition equally. We will
prove that w = vg(w) and w = vg(w). Take S ⊂ N , S /∈ {∅, N}. We denote
the two-person zero-sum game used to determine the worth of coalition S in
the strategic game g(w) by gS(w). This is the game that is used to find both
vg(w)(S) and vg(w)(S). Hence, gS(w) = ({S,N\S}, {XS , XN\S}, {uS ,−uS}).
Superadditivity of w implies that for any partition P(S) of S it holds that
w(S) ≥∑P∈P(S)w(P ). Define the strategy profile y by
yi =
{
S if i ∈ S
{i} if i /∈ S.
Then we have
max
xS∈XS
uS(xS , y−S) = uS(yS , y−S) = w(S)
and uS(yS , x−S) = uS(yS , y−S) for all x−S ∈ XN\S so that
min
x−S∈XN\S
uS(yS , x−S) = uS(yS , y−S) = w(S).
This proves that
vg(w)(S) = w(S) = vg(w)(S).
2
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) showed that every superadditive
coalitional game can be obtained as the game associated with a strategic
game through values of matrix games.7 Proposition 2 shows that the same
is true if the worths of coalitions in strategic games are determined by the
7This appears in Section 57.3 in Chapter XI of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
In their proof, they use the strategic game g(w) that appears in the proof of Proposition
2.
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lower or upper value. Hence, the set of coalitional games associated with
strategic games is exactly the same, independent of whether the value, the
lower value, or the upper value is used to determine worths of coalitions
in strategic games. However, these methods may each associate a different
coalitional game with each strategic game, as is true for the strategic game
in Example 1.
We have shown that for all strategic games, associated coalitional (in-
terval) games based on the lower value, the upper value, or the lowper value
are superadditive and that, in fact, every superadditive coalitional game can
be obtained as arising from a strategic game through either method. This
shows that if we take seriously the idea that coalitional games describe coali-
tions’ possibilities in strategic situations, then those coalitional games are
going to be superadditive, and it also shows that every superadditive coali-
tional game can be interpreted as one that describes coalitions’ possibilities
in strategic situations.
5 Axiomatizations of the lowper value method
In this section we concentrate on the lowper value method and study its
properties. We provide two axiomatic characterizations for the lowper value
method. Both characterizations are inspired by those of the lowper value
function in Section 3.
A method is a function µ : Γ→ IG that associates a coalitional interval
game µ(g) ∈ IGN with every strategic game g ∈ ΓN . Throughout the
following, we will use the notation µ(g)(S) = [µ(g)(S), µ(g)(S)] for g ∈ ΓN
and S ⊂ N . We denote the lowper value method by µV , so that µV (g) = vg.
We now define several properties of methods. The first property is in-
dividual objectivity and it deals with strategic games in which there is a
player i whose payoff does not depend on the actions chosen by the players.
Individual objectivity states that in the coalitional interval game associated
with such a strategic game, player i expects to get this stable payoff, so that
the interval associated with the coalition consisting of this player contains
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only that payoff.
Individual objectivity. For every g ∈ ΓN and every player i ∈ N ,
if there exists a c ∈ R such that ui(x) = c for all x ∈ XN , then
µ(g)(i) = [c, c].
Monotonicity states, loosely speaking, that a (weak) increase in a player’s
payoff for all possible action tuples in a strategic game will weakly increase
this player’s expectations in the associated coalitional interval game.
Monotonicity. Given two strategic games g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈
ΓN and g′ = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {u′i}i∈N ) ∈ ΓN such that ui ≥ u′i for some
player i ∈ N , then for this player i it holds that µ(g)(i) ≥ µ(g′)(i).
Irrelevance of strongly dominated actions states that if a player loses the
ability to use an action that is weakly worse for him than another one of
his actions, this does not affect the player’s expectation in the associated
coalitional interval game.
Irrelevance of strongly dominated actions. In a game g ∈ ΓN ,
an action xi ∈ Xi of player i is strongly dominated if there exists an
action x′i ∈ Xi, x′i 6= xi, such that ui(x′i, xN\i) ≥ ui(xi, xN\i) for all
xN\i ∈ XN\i. For any g ∈ ΓN and player i ∈ N , if action xi ∈ Xi
is strongly dominated, then µ(g)(i) = µ(g′)(i), where g′ ∈ ΓN is the
game obtained from g by deleting action xi.
Irrelevance of strongly dominated threats deals with cross-player effects.
If a player j has an action that is not necessary to keep a player i’s payoff
as low as possible, then the deletion of this action does not affect player i’s
expectations in the associated coalitional interval game.
Irrelevance of strongly dominated threats. In a game g ∈ ΓN , an
action xj ∈ Xj of player j is a strongly dominated threat to player i 6= j
if there exists an action x′j ∈ Xj , x′j 6= xj , such that ui(x′j , xN\j) ≤
ui(xj , xN\j) for all xN\j ∈ XN\j . For any g ∈ ΓN and players i, j ∈ N ,
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i 6= j, if action xj ∈ Xj is a strongly dominated threat to player i,
then µ(g)(i) = µ(g′)(i), where g′ ∈ ΓN is the game obtained from g
by deleting action xj .
The following property, merge invariance, has no equivalent in our char-
acterizations of the lowper value. It deals with coalitions consisting of
more than one player and states that the expectations of such coalitions
are the same whether its members present themselves as a multi-player
coalition or as a single player in a derived strategic game. We need some
additional notation to be able to formally present these ideas. Let g =
(N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈ ΓN and S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅. To study the opportunities
of the members of S as a group, we introduce a new player p(S) with action
set Xp(S) := XS and payoff function up(S) :
∏
j∈(N\S)∪{p(S)}Xj → R defined
by up(S)(xp(S), xN\S) = uS(xS , xN\S) for all xp(S) = xS ∈ XS = Xp(S) and
all xN\S ∈ XN\S . Denote N(S) := (N \S)∪{p(S)}. The game g(S) ∈ ΓN(S)
is defined by g(S) = (N(S), {Xi}i∈N(S), {ui}i∈N(S)).8
Merge invariance. Let g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈ ΓN and S ⊂ N ,
S 6= ∅. Then µ(g)(S) = µ(g(S))(p(S)), where g(S) is the strategic
game obtained from g by considering the coalition S as a single player
p(S).
The properties introduced above are all satisfied by the lowper value
method. Also, among all methods satisfying the properties, the lowper
value method associates the largest possible interval with each coalition of
players.
Theorem 7 The lowper value method µV satisfies individual objectivity,
monotonicity, irrelevance of strongly dominated actions, irrelevance of strong-
ly dominated threats, and merge invariance. Moreover, if µ is a method sat-
isfying these five properties, then µ(g)(S) ⊂ µV (g)(S) for each g ∈ ΓN and
S ⊂ N .
8Note the distinction between the game g(S) defined here and the zero-sum two-player
game gS between S on the one hand and N \ S on the other hand, which we defined in
Section 4.
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Proof. Existence. First, we show that µV satisfies the five properties. Let
g ∈ ΓN , i ∈ N , and c ∈ R be such that ui(x) = c, for all x ∈ XN . Then,
in the matrix Ai of the game gi, all entries are equal to c.9 The lower value
and the upper value of this matrix are equal to c. Hence, µV (g)(i) = [c, c],
which shows that µV satisfies individual objectivity.
Now, let g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈ ΓN and g′ = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {u′i}i∈N )
∈ ΓN be two strategic games such that ui ≥ u′i for player i ∈ N . Then,
Ai ≥ A′i, where Ai denotes the matrix of the game gi and A′i denotes the
matrix of the game g′i. It now follows from monotonicity of the lower and
upper values that µV (g)(i) ≥ µV (g′)(i). This proves that µV satisfies mono-
tonicity.
To see that µV satisfies irrelevance of strongly dominated actions, note
that if action xi of player i is strongly dominated in the game g ∈ ΓN ,
then it corresponds to a strongly dominated row in the matrix Ai of the
game gi. Hence, by weak row dominance of the lowper value, it holds that
µV (g)(i) = µV (g
′)(i), where g′ ∈ ΓN is the game that is obtained from g by
deleting action xi.
To see that µV satisfies irrelevance of strongly dominated threats, note
that if action xj ∈ Xj of a player j is a strongly dominated threat to player
i 6= j in the game g ∈ ΓN , then for all xN\i,j ∈ XN\i,j action (xj , xN\i,j)
corresponds to a strongly dominated column in the matrix Ai of the game
gi. Hence, applying weak column dominance of the lowper value repeatedly,
elimination of the columns corresponding to the actions (xj , xN\i,j) for all
xN\i,j ∈ XN\i,j will not affect the lowper value. The matrix that is left after
eliminating all these columns is that corresponding to the game g′ ∈ ΓN
that is obtained from g by deleting action xj . For this game we thus have
µV (g)(i) = vg(i) = vg′(i) = µV (g
′)(i).
Merge invariance of µV follows straightforwardly by noting that the ma-
trix AS of the strategic game gS derived from g and the matrix Ap(S) of the
strategic game g(S)p(S) derived from g(S) are the same.
Maximality. We proceed by showing the second part of the statement
9To keep our notation as simple as possible, we use gi instead of g{i}.
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in theorem. Let µ : Γ → IG be a method satisfying individual objectiv-
ity, monotonicity, irrelevance of strongly dominated actions, irrelevance of
strongly dominated threats, and merge invariance. Let g = (N, {Xi}i∈N ,
{ui}i∈N ) ∈ ΓN and fix a non-empty coalition S ⊂ N . We have to show that
µ(g)(S) ⊂ µV (g)(S).
If S = N , then merge invariance, irrelevance of strongly dominated ac-
tions, and individual objectivity clearly imply that µ(g)(N) = µV (g)(N).
Assume now that S 6= N . Consider the game g(S) = (N(S), {Xi}i∈N(S),
{ui}i∈N(S)) that is obtained from g by considering the coalition S as a single
player p(S). Because µ satisfies merge invariance, we know that
µ(g)(S) = µ(g(S))(p(S)).
As remarked before, the matrix Ap(S) of the strategic game g(S)p(S) derived
from g(S), and the matrix AS of the strategic game gS derived from g are
the same. Obviously, V (Ap(S)) = V (AS) and V (Ap(S)) = V (AS). We will
show that µ(g)(S) ≥ V (AS) and µ(g)(S) ≤ V (AS).
Part I. µ(g)(S) ≥ V (AS).
Let x = (xi)i∈N ∈
∏
i∈N
Xi be an action tuple such that the lower value
of AS is obtained in the row corresponding to action xS for coalition S
and the column corresponding to action xN\S for coalition N \ S. Define
xp(S) = xS ∈ Xp(S) to be the corresponding action of player p(S).
Let g1 be the game that is obtained from the game g(S) by bounding
the utility of player p(S) from above by V (AS), i.e.,
g1 = (N(S), (Xi)i∈N(S), (ui)i∈N\S , u′p(S)),
where
u′p(S)(xp(S), xN\S) = min{up(S)(xp(S), xN\S), V (AS)}
for all xN\S ∈ XN\S and all xp(S) ∈ Xp(S). Because µ satisfies monotonicity,
we know that
µ(g(S))(p(S)) ≥ µ(g1)(p(S)).
26
Now, note that
V (AS) = max
xp(S)∈Xp(S)
min
xN\S∈XN\S
up(S)(xp(S), xN\S)
is obtained at (xp(S), xN\S), so that minxN\S∈XN\S up(S)(xp(S), xN\S) = V (AS)
and up(S)(xp(S), xN\S) ≥ V (AS) for all xN\S ∈ XN\S . Hence,
u′p(S)(xp(S), xN\S) = V (AS)
for all xN\S ∈ XN\S . Moreover, we have u′p(S)(xp(S), xN\S) ≤ V (AS) for
all xN\S ∈ XN\S and all xp(S) ∈ Xp(S). Hence, every action xp(S) ∈ Xp(S),
xp(S) 6= xp(S), is strongly dominated by action xp(S). Because µ satisfies
irrelevance of strongly dominated actions, we can eliminate all the actions
xp(S) 6= xp(S) of player p(S). Hence,
µ(g1)(p(S)) = µ(g2)(p(S)),
where g2 is the game that is obtained from g1 by deleting all actions of player
p(S) except action xp(S).
In the game g2, for every player j 6= p(S) every action xj ∈ Xj \ xj is a
strongly dominated threat to player p(S), because u′p(S)(xp(S), xN\S)
= minxN\S∈XN\S u
′
p(S)(xp(S), xN\S). Since µ satisfies irrelevance of strongly
dominated threats, we can eliminate all these strongly dominated threats to
player p(S). Hence,
µ(g2)(p(S)) = µ(g3)(p(S)),
where g3 is the game that is obtained from g2 by deleting all actions xj ∈
Xj \ xj for every player j ∈ N \ S.
In the game g3 every player j has exactly one action, xj . Hence, for this
game we can use individual objectivity of µ to derive that
µ(g3)(p(S)) = u′p(S)(x).
We now have µ(g)(S) = µ(g(S))(p(S)) ≥ µ(g1)(p(S)) = µ(g2)(p(S)) =
µ(g3)(p(S)) = u′p(S)(x) = V (AS).
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Part II. µ(g)(S) ≤ V (AS).
Now, let x¯ = (x¯i)i∈N ∈
∏
i∈N
Xi be an action tuple such that the upper
value of AS is obtained in the row corresponding to action x¯S for coalition
S and the column corresponding to action x¯N\S for coalition N \ S. Define
x¯p(S) = x¯S ∈ Xp(S) to be the corresponding action of player p(S).
We will define a new game g4 by deleting actions for players in N\S.
Without loss of generality, we assume that N\S = {1, 2, . . . , k}, where k
denotes the number of players in N\S.
We first define the game g∗1 that is obtained from the game g(S) by
changing the payoffs of player p(S) to
u1p(S)(xp(S), x1, (xi)i∈{2,3,...,k}) =
max{up(S)(xp(S), x1, (xi)i∈{2,3,...,k}), up(S)(xp(S), x¯1, (xi)i∈{2,3,...,k})},
where xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and xp(S) ∈ Xp(S). Because µ satisfies
monotonicity, we know that
µ(g(S))(p(S)) ≤ µ(g∗1)(p(S)).
In the game g∗1, every action x1 ∈ X1, x1 6= x¯1, is a strongly dominated
threat to player p(S)˙ because u1p(S)(xp(S), x¯1, (xi)i∈{2,3,...,k}) ≤ u1p(S)(xp(S), x1,
(xi)i∈{2,3,...,k}) for all xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, and xp(S) ∈ Xp(S). Since µ
satisfies irrelevance of strongly dominated threats, we can eliminate all these
strongly dominated threats to player p(S) from g∗1 without changing the
worth of p(S) in the image of the game under µ. Hence,
µ(g∗1)(p(S)) = µ(g
#
1 )(p(S)),
where g#1 is the game that is obtained from g
∗
1 by deleting all actions x1 ∈
X1\x¯1. Note that for all xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, and xp(S) ∈ Xp(S)
u1p(S)(xp(S), x¯1, (xi)i∈{2,...,k}) = up(S)(xp(S), x¯1, (xi)i∈{2,...,k}).
We proceed by induction. Let 2 ≤ j ≤ k and suppose that we have
deleted all actions xi ∈ Xi\x¯i for all players i = 1, 2, . . . , j − 1 and de-
fined the corresponding games g∗i and g
#
i with payoff functions u
i
p(S) for
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player p(S) such that each player i = 1, 2, . . . , j − 1 has only action x¯i
in the games g#i , g
#
i+1, . . . , g
#
j−1, u
j−1
p(S)(xp(S), (x¯i)i∈{1,...,j−1}, (xi)i∈{j,...,k}) =
up(S)(xp(S), (x¯i)i∈{1,...,j−1}, (xi)i∈{j,...,k}) for all xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ {j, . . . , k}, and
xp(S) ∈ Xp(S), and µ(g(S))(p(S)) ≤ µ(g∗j−1)(p(S)) = µ(g#j−1)(p(S)). To ob-
tain the game g∗j from the game g
#
j−1, we change the payoffs of player p(S)
to
ujp(S)(xp(S), (x¯i)i∈{1,...,j−1}, xj , (xi)i∈{j+1,...,k}) =
max{uj−1p(S)(xp(S), (x¯i)i∈{1,...,j−1}, xj , (xi)i∈{j+1,...,k}),
uj−1p(S)(xp(S), (x¯i)i∈{1,...,j−1}, x¯j , (xi)i∈{j+1,...,k})},
where xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ {j, . . . , k} and xp(S) ∈ Xp(S). Because µ satisfies
monotonicity, we know that
µ(g#j−1)(p(S)) ≤ µ(g∗j )(p(S)).
In the game g∗j , every action xj ∈ Xj , xj 6= x¯j , is a strongly dominated
threat to player p(S). Because µ satisfies irrelevance of strongly dominated
threats, we can eliminate all these strongly dominated threats to player p(S)
from g∗j without changing the worth of p(S) in the image of the game under
µ. Hence,
µ(g∗j )(p(S)) = µ(g
#
j )(p(S)),
where g#j is the game that is obtained from g
∗
j by deleting all actions xj ∈
Xj\x¯j . Also, for all xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ {j + 1, . . . , k}, and xp(S) ∈ Xp(S)
ujp(S)(xp(S), (x¯i)i∈{1,...,j}, (xi)i∈{j+1,...,k})
= uj−1p(S)(xp(S), (x¯i)i∈{1,...,j}, (xi)i∈{j+1,...,k})
= up(S)(xp(S), (x¯i)i∈{1,...,j}, (xi)i∈{j+1,...,k}).
The game g4 is the game g
#
k that emerges from the procedure described
above. In this game, every player i ∈ N\S has only one action, namely x¯i.
The payoff function of player p(S) in the game g4 is up(S) because
ukp(S)(xp(S), x¯N\S) = up(S)(xp(S), x¯N\S)
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for all xp(S) ∈ Xp(S). Also,
µ(g(S))(p(S)) ≤ µ(g4)(p(S)).
Now, note that
V (AS) = min
xN\S∈XN\S
max
xp(S)∈Xp(S)
up(S)(xp(S), xN\S)
is obtained at (x¯p(S), x¯N\S), so that maxxp(S)∈Xp(S) up(S)(xp(S), x¯N\S) =
V (AS) = up(S)(x¯p(S), x¯N\S). This means that every action xp(S) ∈ Xp(S)\x¯p(S)
is strongly dominated by action x¯p(S) in the game g4. Because µ satisfies
irrelevance of strongly dominated actions, we can eliminate all these strongly
dominated actions of player p(S). Hence,
µ(g4)(p(S)) = µ(g5)(p(S)),
where g5 is the game that is obtained from g4 by deleting all actions xp(S) ∈
Xp(S) except action x¯p(S).
In the game g5 every player j has exactly one action, x¯j . Hence, for this
game we can use individual objectivity of µ to derive that
µ(g5)(p(S)) = up(S)(x¯).
We now have µ(g)(S) = µ(g(S))(p(S)) ≤ µ(g4)(p(S)) = µ(g5)(p(S)) =
up(S)(x¯) = V (AS).
This ends the proof. 2
As we did for the lowper value function in Theorem 6, we can make
the axiomatization of the lowper value method tight by adding two axioms
that are stronger versions of irrelevance of strongly dominated actions and
irrelevance of strongly dominated threats for the upper and lower bounds,
respectively.
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Irrelevance of weakly dominated actions in the upper bound.
In a game g ∈ ΓN , an action xi ∈ Xi of player i is weakly dominated
if for every xN\i ∈ XN\i there exists an action x′i ∈ Xi, x′i 6= xi, such
that ui(x′i, xN\i) ≥ ui(xi, xN\i). For any g ∈ ΓN and player i ∈ N ,
if action xi ∈ Xi is weakly dominated then µ(g)(i) = µ(g′)(i), where
g′ ∈ ΓN is the game obtained from g by deleting action xi.
Irrelevance of weakly dominated threats in the lower bound.
In a game g ∈ ΓN , an action xj ∈ Xj of player j is a weakly dominated
threat to player i 6= j if for every xN\j ∈ XN\j there exists an action
x′j ∈ Xj , x′j 6= xj , such that ui(x′j , xN\j) ≤ ui(xj , xN\j). For any
g ∈ ΓN and players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, if action xj ∈ Xj is a weakly
dominated threat to player i, then µ(g)(i) = µ(g′)(i), where g′ ∈ ΓN
is the game obtained from g by deleting action xj .
Theorem 8 The lowper value method µV is the unique method that sat-
isfies individual objectivity, monotonicity, irrelevance of strongly dominated
actions, irrelevance of strongly dominated threats, irrelevance of weakly dom-
inated actions in the upper bound, irrelevance of weakly dominated threats
in the lower bound, and merge invariance.
Proof. Existence. In light of Theorem 7, we only need to show that µV
satisfies irrelevance of weakly dominated actions in the upper bound and
irrelevance of weakly dominated threats in the lower bound. To see that µV
satisfies irrelevance of weakly dominated actions in the upper bound, note
that if action xi of player i is weakly dominated in the game g ∈ ΓN , then
it corresponds to a weakly dominated row in the matrix Ai of the game gi.
Hence, by strong row dominance in the upper bound of the lowper value, it
holds that µV (g)(i) = µV (g
′)(i), where g′ ∈ ΓN is the game that is obtained
from g by deleting action xi.
To see that µV satisfies irrelevance of weakly dominated threats in the
lower bound, note that if action xj ∈ Xj of a player j is a weakly dominated
threat to player i 6= j in the game g ∈ ΓN , then for all xN\i,j ∈ XN\i,j action
(xj , xN\i,j) corresponds to a weakly dominated column in the matrix Ai of
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the game gi. Hence, applying strong column dominance in the lower bound
of the lowper value repeatedly, elimination of the columns corresponding
to the actions (xj , xN\i,j) will not affect the lower bound of the interval
µV (g)(i). The matrix that is left after eliminating all these columns is that
corresponding to the game g′ ∈ ΓN that is obtained from g by deleting
action xj . For this game we thus have µV (g)(i) = µV (g
′)(i).
Uniqueness. Let µ : Γ → IG be a method satisfying the seven axioms
mentioned in the statement of the theorem. Let g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈
ΓN and fix a non-empty coalition S ⊂ N . It readily follows from Theorem
7 that µ(g)(S) ⊂ µV (g)(S), so the proof of uniqueness will be completed if
we prove that µ(g)(S) ≤ µ
V
(g)(S) and µ(g)(S) ≥ µV (g)(S).
If S = N , then merge invariance, irrelevance of strongly dominated ac-
tions, and individual objectivity clearly imply that µ(g)(N) = µV (g)(N).
Assume now that S 6= N . Consider the game g(S) = (N(S), {Xi}i∈N(S),
{ui}i∈N(S)) that is obtained from g by considering the coalition S as a single
player p(S). Because µ satisfies merge invariance, we know that
µ(g)(S) = µ(g(S))(p(S)).
As remarked before, the matrix Ap(S) of the strategic game g(S)p(S) derived
from g(S), and the matrix AS of the strategic game gS derived from g are
the same. Obviously, V (Ap(S)) = V (AS) and V (Ap(S)) = V (Ap(S)). We will
show that µ(g)(S) ≤ V (AS) and µ(g)(S) ≥ V (AS).
Part I. µ(g)(S) ≤ V (AS). This follows straightforwardly from Theorem
7 in Carpente et al. (2005).
Part II. µ(g)(S) ≥ V (AS).
Let x¯ = (x¯i)i∈N ∈
∏
i∈N
Xi be an action such that the upper value of AS
is obtained in the row corresponding to action x¯S for coalition S and the
column corresponding to action x¯N\S for coalition N \ S. Define x¯p(S) =
x¯S ∈ Xp(S) to be the corresponding action of player p(S).
We define a new game g1 by adding an action x∗p(S) for player p(S) in
the game g(S). The payoff to player p(S) is as in the game g(S) when he
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plays an action xp(S) ∈ Xp(S) and it is equal to V (AS) when he plays action
x∗p(S). Since
V (AS) = min
xN\S∈XN\S
max
xp(S)∈Xp(S)
up(S)(xp(S), xN\S),
it holds that maxxp(S)∈Xp(S) up(S)(xp(S), xN\S) ≥ V (AS) = up(S)(x∗p(S), xN\S)
for all xN\S ∈ XN\S . This means that action x∗p(S) is a weakly dominated
action in the game g1. Because µ satisfies irrelevance of weakly dominated
actions in the upper bound, we can eliminate this weakly dominated ac-
tion from g1 without changing the upper bound of the interval µ(g1)(p(S)).
Hence,
µ(g(S))(p(S)) = µ(g1)(p(S)).
Let g2 be the game that is obtained from the game g1 by bounding the
payoff of player p(S) from above by V (AS), i.e., the payoff function of player
p(S) is now
u′p(S)(xp(S), xN\S) = min{up(S)(xp(S), xN\S), V (AS)}
for all xN\S ∈ XN\S and all xp(S) ∈ Xp(S) ∪ {x∗p(S)}.
Because µ satisfies monotonicity, we know that
µ(g1)(p(S)) ≥ µ(g2)(p(S)).
Obviously, in the game g2 all actions xp(S) ∈ Xp(S) are strongly dom-
inated by action x∗p(S). Because µ satisfies irrelevance of strongly domi-
nated actions, we can eliminate all these strongly dominated actions without
changing the worth of player p(S) in the image of the game under µ. Hence,
µ(g2)(p(S)) = µ(g3)(p(S)),
where g3 is the game that is obtained from g2 by deleting all actions of player
p(S) except action x∗p(S).
In the game g3, player p(S) has only one action and the payoff to this
player is up(S)(x∗p(S), xN\S) = V (AS) for all xN\S ∈ XN\S . Hence, for every
player j 6= p(S) every action xj ∈ Xj is a strongly dominated threat to
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player p(S) and all but one can be eliminated by irrelevance of strongly
dominated threats. Therefore,
µ(g3)(p(S)) = µ(g4)(p(S)),
where g4 is the game that is obtained from g3 by deleting for every player
j ∈ N\S all actions except one, an arbitrarily chosen x∗j ∈ Xj .
In the game g4 every player i ∈ N(S) has exactly one action, x∗i , and
hence, for this game we can use individual objectivity of µ to derive that
µ(g4)(p(S)) = up(S)(x
∗) = V (AS).
We proved that µ(g)(S) = µ(g(S))(p(S)) = µ(g1)(p(S)) ≥ µ(g2)(p(S)) =
µ(g3)(p(S)) = µ(g4)(p(S)) = V (AS).
This ends the proof. 2
6 Concluding remarks
Carpente et al. (2004) define a valuation function that associates with every
non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the
members of the coalition. This vector of payoffs provides these players’
valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The valuation function defined
in Carpente et al. (2004) is based on the lower-value method of associating
coalitional games with strategic games and the Shapley value for coalitional
games. An axiomatic characterization of this so-called Shapley valuation
was obtained.
We can extend the results in Carpente et al. (2004) to the setting of
interval games as follows. Define a valuation correspondence as a map ϕ
that associates with every game g ∈ ΓN and non-empty coalition S ⊂
N a vector of closed intervals ϕ(S, g) = (ϕi(S, g))i∈S , where ϕi(S, g) =
[ϕ
i
(S, g), ϕi(S, g)] ⊂ R provides an interval valuation for player i of coop-
erating in coalition S in game g, for each i ∈ S. The Shapley valuation
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correspondence Φ is given by Φ(S, g) = ([Φi(S, vg),Φi(S, vg)])i∈S , where vg
and vg are the lower-value method and the upper-value method, respectively,
and Φ denotes the Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953)). The axiomatization
of the lowper value method that we provided in Theorem 8 in the cur-
rent paper can be used to find an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley
valuation correspondence Φ. The procedure followed to obtain this charac-
terization is similar in flavor to that followed in Carpente et al. (2004). It
involves adapting the properties in the current paper to the setting of val-
uation correspondences and introducing an additional property of balanced
contributions. A valuation correspondence ϕ satisfies balanced contributions
if for all g ∈ ΓN and non-empty S ⊂ N , and all i, j ∈ S, it holds that
ϕi(S, g)− ϕi(S\{j}, g) = ϕj(S, g)− ϕj(S\{i}, g).
Theorem 9 The Shapley valuation correspondence Φ is the unique valu-
ation correspondence satisfying individual objectivity, monotonicity, irrele-
vance of strongly dominated actions, irrelevance of strongly dominated threats,
irrelevance of weakly dominated actions in the upper bound, irrelevance of
weakly dominated threats in the lower bound, merge invariance, and balanced
contributions.
We leave the details of this theorem to the reader. They are pretty
straightforward using the results in the current paper and the definitions
and line of proof in Carpente et al. (2004) for inspiration.
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